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What Is “PersonalIty”?
an UnderexamIned ParagraPh In sPInoza
Jacob Adler *
In Spinoza’s Cogitata Metaphysica (known in English as the Metaphysical Thoughts) we read the following paragraph:
The will of God, by which He chooses to 
love Himself, follows necessarily from His 
understanding, by which He knows Himself. 
But we do not know how His essence and 
His understanding, by which he knows 
Himself, differ from His will, by which he 
chooses to love Himself. Nor does the term 
personality, which the theologians use to 
explain this, escape our notice. Although 
we are not ignorant of the term, we are 
ignorant of its significance, and unable 
to form any clear and distinct concept of 
its content. Nevertheless, we consistently 
believe in the beatific vision of God, which 
is promised to faithful ones that this would 
be revealed to them.1
Spinoza may disavow any knowledge of what 
the theologians mean by the word personalitas, 
but that leaves us with the question: What 
does it mean? Or, more precisely, what is the 
theologians’ use of the word of which Spinoza 
disavows any knowledge?
 Surprisingly, this question has received 
virtually no attention. Writers do suggest 
answers, but seemingly without awareness that 
there is a disputed question here. In particular, 
there are two basic answers. Most present 
one answer or the other; at least one person 
advocates both. But in every case, there is little 
or no argumentation supporting the proposed 
answer. The issue is of some importance, for 
our interpretation of the paragraph depends on 
the meaning given to the word in question.
 The two answers are as follows: 
Personalitas may mean “the condition of being a 
person” or “the characteristics that are distinctive 
1 Spinoza, Metaphysical Thoughts, Part 2, Chapter 8, 
Paragraph 1; Complete Works, 200.
of persons,” as opposed to animals or inanimate 
objects. We might now say “personhood.” On 
this interpretation, the question is whether 
God is a Person, or whether there is only an 
impersonal God. This is the meaning given to 
the word by Harry Austryn Wolfson, Nancy 
Levene, H. H. Britan, Marilena Chauí (in one 
publication), Clement Webb, E. E. Harris.2 
 The other answer is that personalitas 
refers to the characteristics that distinguish one 
Person of the Holy Trinity from the others. This 
is the answer advocated by Carlos Fraenkel and 
Yitzhak Melamed.3
 The only writer who shows an awareness 
that there are two possible answers seems to 
be the above-mentioned Marilena Chauí, who 
refers both of them in a subsequent publication.4 
But even here we find only a passing mention 
in an endnote. Her discussion in that note, brief 
though it is, at least addresses the issue. She 
cites one relevant source for the Trinitarian 
interpretation, namely, Augustine’s De 
Trinitate. However, with regard to the concept 
of personality as personhood, she notes (quite 
correctly) that Spinoza elsewhere denies the 
personhood of God, and she then merely reads 
that denial into the paragraph in question. 
 In considering this issue, we have 
one other text that needs to be taken into 
consideration: In Letter 12A, Spinoza writes to 
Lodewijk Meijer, “Finally, it eludes me what the 
theologians mean by the word ‘personalitas,’ 
but I am aware of the meaning attached to 
2 Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 329-330; Levene, 
Spinoza’s Revelation, 97-98; Britan, “Introduction,” xxxv-
xxvi; Chauí, “Ser Parte e Ter Parte,” 83; Webb, God and 
Personality, 70; Harris, Salvation from Despair, 380.
3 Fraenkel, “Could Spinoza Have Presented […]?” 22 
n.49;”Christus Secundum Spiritum,” 146).
4 Chauí, “A instituição do campo politico,” 320-321, 
n. 20. I thank Professor Chauí for directing me to this 
passage.
* University of Arkansas, Philosophy Department.
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it by philologists.”5 The word ‘philologists’ 
here translates the Latin critici, a synonym of 
philologi and grammatici. One of their functions 
is “glossarum explicatio,” i.e., the explanation of 
unusual words.6 
 In this paper I will argue that the second 
meaning is the correct one: Spinoza is talking 
about personality in the specifically theological 
sense of the state of being a person of the Holy 
Trinity. I argue first, negatively, that there are 
good reasons to reject the interpretation of 
personality as personhood. Secondly, there are 
good reasons to support the Trinitarian sense of 
“personality.”
 Why should we care about this point? 
Aside from the intrinsic interest in understanding 
what Spinoza wrote, my proposed answer is, I 
suggest, indicative of Spinoza’s interest in and 
knowledge of Christianity, down to what one 
might consider a fine point of Christology.
 As for the negative, Spinoza says quite 
clearly that he knows what philologists mean by 
the term. That would be the ordinary meaning 
of the term—that is, what we might now call 
“personhood.” There is nothing particularly 
theological about this concept, although 
theologians (along with everyone else) may 
make use of it. So “personhood” cannot be the 
meaning at issue here. This simple argument, 
brief though it is, seems to be fairly conclusive, 
as far as it goes.
 This leaves us with the positive task of 
finding a possible usage of the word personalitas 
that is unique to the theologians. And there 
is, indeed, such a usage. Thomas Aquinas 
describes it in his Disputed Questions on Power. 
Aquinas writes, “The fact that person designates 
one thing in God and another in man must be 
referred to a difference in suppositality rather 
than in the signification of the word person: 
and equivocation arises from a difference 
in signification but not in suppositality.”7 In 
5 Spinoza, Complete Works, 792.
6 Lehrs, De Vocabulis Philologos, Grammatikos, Kritikos, 1,11.
7 “[H]oc quod persona aliud significat in Deo et homine, 
pertinet ad diversitatem suppositionis magis quam ad 
diversam significationem huius communis, quod est persona. 
Diversa autem suppositio non facit aequivocationem, sed 
diversa significatio.” Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of 
God, Q. 9, Article 4, repl. obj. 6 [vol. 3, 217]; Thomas 
Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. 
particular, person as applied to God refers to 
a kind of relation, whereas when applied to 
human beings and angels, it refers to something 
absolute.8 These relations within God, Aquinas 
says, are called by some personalities.9. Here we 
have, clearly stated, the difference between the 
philologists’ and the theologians’ usages of the 
word personalitas. 
 This usage of the word personalitas is 
abundant in Roman Catholic writers, as may be 
easily seen from an internet database search,10 
but it is found also among the Protestant 
writers of Spinoza’s time and place, whose 
version of Christianity is the principal one 
that Spinoza had to deal with. For example, 
Johannes Hoornbeek, professor of theology at 
the Universities of Leiden and Utrecht, writes:
We know that God is one in essence and one 
in name […]. The persons are distinguished 
from [God’s] essence not as distinct things 
or entities, but by personality, that is to say11 
the manner of subsisting, τρόπῳ ὑπάρξεως, 
with the invariable unity and identity of 
essence remaining unchanged.12 
Dutch Protestant writers of Spinoza’s time also 
note the distinction between the meaning of 
“person” as applied to God and to creatures. 
Paul Voet, son of the famous theologian Gijsbert 
Voet, for example, provides an extensive 
discussion of the point in his Philosophia 
Naturalis Reformata.13 Antonius Walaeus, citing 
8 Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, Q. 9, Article 4, 
obj. 6 (vol. 3, 111). 
9 Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, Q. 8, Article 4, 
answer (vol. 3, 92).
10 If searching digitized texts from the seventeenth 
century and before, which make use of the long ‘S,’ one 
must often use the form perfonalitas and its derivative 
forms as a search term.
11 Reading seu in place of ceu. I thank Mark Reynolds for 
this suggestion. The reading found in the text yields no 
intelligible meaning.
12 Hoornbeek, Pro Convincendis et Convertendis Judaeis, 
401. Cf. Hoornbeek, Institutiones Theologicae, 718, §§28-
30: “Having considered God’s essence, we now turn 
also to the persons, which are three, the Father and the 
Son and the Holy Spirit, which are of one and the same 
essence, being distinguished only by personalities.” See 
also, among other Protestant writers of Spinoza’s time 
and place, Maccovius, Loci Communes Theologici, 243;P. 
Voet, Theologia Naturalis Reformata, 117-118; D. Voet, 
Compendium Pneumaticae, 46-47, 175-176; Desmarets, 
Dissertatio Theologica, 366-367.
13 P. Voet, Philosophia Naturalis, 57-61, 124-125. 
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Augustine, is perhaps closest to Spinoza. He 
writes that the term personality, as applied to 
God, cannot truly be understood.14 Walaeus is 
willing to use the word anyway; Spinoza is not.
 The points brought up by Spinoza in this 
paragraph of the Cogitata Metaphysica have their 
home in a theory of the Trinity propounded by 
St. Thomas Aquinas, followed by many others. 
The idea is that God understands himself, and in 
understanding himself he has an internal Word 
– the object of His knowledge. God as Knower 
is the Father; God as Known is the Son. The 
operation of God’s will leads him to love Himself 
– sometimes it is said that the love is between the 
Father and Son – and this love is the Holy Spirit. 
These two aspects of the origin of the persons 
are called the processions. This explanation of the 
Trinity is, one must note, in no way intended as 
a proof or rational argument for the conclusion 
that there is such a Trinity. The Trinity can be 
known only by faith; in theological terms, it is a 
mystery.15. The account in terms of understanding 
and love merely gives us a way of conceiving 
that which can be known only by faith. Indeed, 
if we were to use natural reason, there would 
be no reason to stop at two internal operations: 
we could say that God not only knows and loves 
Himself, but that He requests things of Himself, 
proposes things to Himself, prays to Himself.16 
Each of these self-relations would result in a 
different “Person,” and there would be not just a 
Trinity but an infinity of Persons. 
 These details relevant to this concept of 
the Trinity are put forward by Thomas in many 
places.17 Catholics were thus naturally aware 
of this way of thinking about the Trinity, but 
Protestants took note of it as well. A very clear 
statement of it is found in Antonius Walaeus’ 
Enchiridion Religionis Reformatae, a prominent 
theological textbook.18 On a more popular 
level, the same line of reasoning can be found 
in a didactic poem by Joost van den Vondel, 
14 Walaeus, Enchiridion Religionis Reformatae, 236.
15 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.32.1, Answer.
16 On God’s prayer, see Babylonian Talmud, Tractate 
Berakhot, p. 7a.
17 For example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
1.27.3, Answer; Thomas Aquinas, Compendium of 
Theology, ch. 37 and 52.
18 Walaeus, Enchiridion Religionis Reformatae, 30.
often called the Shakespeare of Holland.19 The 
Vondel connection is particularly important, 
because Vondel’s poetic account is referenced by 
Spinoza’s friend, Jarig Jelles, in his Confession of 
the Universal Christian Faith, a book that Spinoza 
knew and (apparently) approved of.20 Spinoza 
in any case would probably have learned of 
this theory of the Trinity from members of the 
Amsterdam Jewish community, many of whom 
had lived double lives as Conversos in Portugal 
and were thus educated in Roman Catholic 
theology.
 It seems clear, then, that Spinoza is 
talking about this concept of the Trinity, based 
on God’s self-knowledge and self-love, and the 
concept of personalitas by which the Persons are 
said to be distinguished. 
 There is one further reason to reject 
the personhood interpretation and accept the 
Trinitarian interpretation. Those who argue in 
favor of the former view point out the distinctness 
of intellect and will in persons, something 
indeed not present in Spinoza’s God.21 However, 
the paragraph in the Cogitata Metaphysica 
emphasizes the distinctness of understanding, 
intellect, and essence in God. Essence seems not 
to be in play in the personhood interpretation. It 
is, however, very much in play in the Trinitarian 
interpretation.22  
 What then of the wry remarks with which 
Spinoza concludes the paragraph? Spinoza 
says he can form no clear and distinct concept 
of personalitas. That is hardly a surprise: the 
concept is part of the mystery of the Trinity, and 
a mystery is something that transcends human 
19 Vondel, Bespiegelingen, 748.
20 Jelles, Belydenisse, 48 (pp. 26-27 of the first ed.); 
Spinoza, Ep. 48B. The editor of the first edition of the 
Belydenisse transcribes the relevant verses of Vondel’s 
Bespiegelingen on pp. 165-166. On Spinoza’s approval of 
this work of Jelles, see the editorial notes to Ep. 48A and 
Ep. 48B in Spinoza, The Letters, 252 n. 245 and 255 n. 248. 
Spinoza’s statement – ambigous in itself – that Jelles need 
make no changes is actually in response to Jelles’ question 
as to whether the Belydenisse (“Confession”) agrees with 
the truth of the matter. In suggesting no changes, Spinoza 
would therefore appear to commit himself to the view that 
the Belydenisse does agree with the truth.  
21 See the above-cited passages from Wolfson, Levene, 
Britan, et al.
22 See, for example, the quotation from Hoornbeek’s Pro 
Convincendis et Convertendis Judaeis presented above.
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understanding and can be known only by faith–
in other words, for Spinoza, it is something that 
cannot be known at all.
 The reference to the “beatific vision” 
clinches the points just made. The beatific vision 
is indeed, as Spinoza says, the vision of God that 
will be granted to those who die free of mortal 
sin. In this state they will “see the divine essence 
by intuitive vision […] with no mediating 
creature, serving in the capacity of an object 
seen, but divine essence immediately revealing 
itself plainly, clearly, and openly, to them.”23 
The particular promise mentioned by Spinoza 
was made by Pope Eugenius IV in the Papal Bull 
“Laetentur Coeli” of 1439, where it is stated 
that those who die without mortal sin will “see 
clearly the one and triune God Himself, just as 
He is […]” (Denzinger, Sources §693). This view 
is confirmed by Reformed theologians as well, 
though they differ in detail.24 We don’t need a 
beatific vision to understand what is meant by 
calling God a person, as opposed to impersonal: 
most would say that that is a clear concept of 
natural theology. We do need a beatific vision to 
pierce through the cloud of mystery and perceive 
clearly the nature of the Trinity. 
 We may, then, at least provisionally 
conclude as proposed: Spinoza is referring in this 
paragraph to the Holy Trinity and the concept 
of personalitas invoked by theologians in an 
attempt to explain the distinctions between the 
Persons of the Trinity. There is, however, one 
last consideration that must give us pause. We 
have seen that Meijer did substantial editorial 
work on the Cogitata Metaphysica. It is possible 
that the paragraph on which we are focusing 
is one of those edited by Meijer, following 
Spinoza’s instructions in Ep. 12A? Spinoza 
there instructs Meijer that he should eliminate 
the statement, “the Son of God is the Father 
himself,” if it seems to him that it would give 
offence to the theologians. Meijer evidently did 
think so, for the statement does not occur in the 
Cogitata Metaphysica that was published. Instead 
23 Pope Benedict XII, “Benedictus Deus” (1334), in 
Denzinger, Sources §530.
24 Walaeus, Loci Communes, 526-527; Polyander, 
Synopsis, Disputation 52, Theses 21-22. The Synopsis was 
a very popular and often reprinted textbook for Reformed 
theology students: see Belt, 148 and Werkgezelschap, 
Projectbeschrijving.
we find a more subtle statement to the much 
same effect. It may be, then, that it is Meijer, 
not Spinoza, who wrote the sentences we have 
been discussing. If Meijer did write the words in 
question, can we still attribute to Spinoza such 
a knowledge of Christian theology? I would 
answer that whether Spinoza or Meijer inserted 
the lines under discussion here, Spinoza would 
have known about. Surely an author as careful 
as Spinoza would make a point of knowing what 
was in his own book, even if he had to learn it 
was edited by Meijer. Spinoza in general showed 
considerable concern for the reception of his 
books and knew that he would have to defend 
controversial statements. So if Meijer did happen 
to write these lines, Spinoza would have all the 
more reason for making sure he understood 
them. Our conclusion, then, remains in place.
 This conclusion sheds light on a related 
problem, the paradox that for Spinoza, God’s 
attributes are identical yet different. Orthodox 
Christians must explain how each of the Persons 
is God, and yet the Persons are distinct. Spinoza 
must in parallel manner explain how each of 
the Attributes is God, and yet the Attributes 
are distinct. Structurally, the two problems are 
one. Indeed, Spinoza must have known that 
the Medieval philosophical Hebrew word for 
“Person [of the Trinity]” is to’ar, which also 
the word for “attribute.”25 These considerations 
25 Implicit in Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, 1:50 
(ed. Shlomo Pines [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1960], p. 111): “If […] someone believes that He is one, but 
possesses a certain number of essential attributes, he says in 
his words that He is one, but believes Him in his thought to be 
many. This resembles what the Christians say: namely, that 
He is one but also three, and that the three are one; explicit 
in Saadya Gaon, Emunot ve-De‘ot, Bk. 3, ch. 5, p. 92; Ḥasdai 
Crescas, Bitul ‘Ikere ha-Notsrim, chapter 3, p. 251, with 
commentary by Joseph ben Shem Tov ibn Shem Tov on pp. 
268-270; Profiat Duran, ’Igeret ’Al Tehi ka-’Avotekha, in Melo 
Ḥofnayim, ed. Abraham Geiger (Berlin: W. Wilzig, 1840), 
Hebrew section, p. 43; Joseph ben Shem Tov ibn Shem Tov, 
Commentary to Profiat Duran, ’Igeret ’Al Tehi ka-’Avotekha, 
in ’Igeret ‘Ogeret, ed. Isaac Akrish, 2nd ed. (Breslau, 1844): 
unpaginated, but the relevant passage begins on the page 
with the numeral 2 at the bottom; Profiat Duran, Kelimat 
ha-Goyim, 15; Leon Modena, Magen va-Ḥerev, 21, 25. And 
see further references in Crescas, Bitul, p. 131, n. 1. Spinoza 
was surely acquainted with the above-cited passage from 
Maimonides. As for the other writers cited here, we cannot 
know if he read their works; they are adduced to show that 
the word to’ar was used as the translation of the word person 
[of the Trinity], a fact that Spinoza likely did know.
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provide a bit of support for those who see in 
Spinozism a philosophized Christianity, or at 
least something approaching it.26
 Be that as it may, Spinoza’s serious 
interest in the details of Christian theology 
deserves our attention when it comes to 
interpreting his frequent though scattered 
statements on Christian topics.
k k k
26 Jelles, ‘Voorreeden’, 3v – 4v; Klever, Definitie van het 
Christendom; Farrar, History of Interpretation, 383-384; 
Hunter, Radical Protestantism; and see Lech Szczucki’s 
discussion of Christophorus Sandius in “Sandius,” 381.
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